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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does the Utah Supreme Court have jurisdiction to 
consider this appeal? 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
(a) failing to inform the defendant of his constitutional 
right to be represented by an attorney at trial, (b) failing 
to appoint an attorney, and (c) failing to secure a waiver 
of right to counsel? 
3. Did the District Court commit reversible error 
by (a) failing to inform the appellant of his constitutional 
right to be represented by an attorney on appeal, (b) failing 
to appoint an attorney, and (c) failing to secure a waiver of 
right to counsel? 
iv 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
vs. : 
MYRON A. HAMILTON, : Case No. 20646 
Defendant/Appellant : Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the affirmance of convictions 
and sentences imposed for Failure to Respond to an Officer's 
Signal to Stop, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-13.5 (1953 as amended); Failure to Obey a 
Police Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-13; Interference with a Public Servant, a Class 
B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-301; Speed-
ing, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-46; and No Driver's 
License on Person, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-2-15. 
The appellant was found guilty following a jury trial which 
occurred on February 27 and 28, 1984 in the Fifth Circuit Court, 
Sandy Department, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable C. Bailey Sainsbury, Judge, presiding. The same 
court sentenced the appellant to thirty days in the county 
jail and to pay a fine of $998.00. An appeal was taken to the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ite of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presid-
j. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. 
Statement of Facts 
On November 5, 1983, at approximately 6:30 p.m. in the 
a^ of 350 West 10600 South, in Salt Lake County, the defendant, 
ron A. Hamilton, was observed in a white Chevrolet pick-up 
th no visible license plates, traveling at a high rate of 
eed. When police officers turned on their overhead light 
e vehicle did not respond. After an officer turned on his 
otlight to get the driver's attention, the defendant pulled 
er (R.241-242). r 
As the officer approached the vehicle a verbal alterca-
.on occurred, and the officer asked Mr. Hamilton to produce 
„s driver's license. The defendant refused and the officer 
lformed him he was under arrest (R.,242). 
When the officer requested the defendant step out of 
Ls truck, the defendant refused and left the scene to return to 
Ls home. The officer followed and with the assistance of other 
fficers, placed Mr. Hamilton under arrest (R.242). 
At trial before the Circuit Court, the defendant requested 
he court appoint him the counsel of his choice (R.465-67). 
he request was denied because the requested counsel was not a 
tember of the Utah State Bar (R.466). The defendant subsequently 
;erved as his own counsel, a situation which did not further 
:oncern the trial judge. There was no inquiry by the court about 
:he wisdom of the defendant's self-representation or about the 
-2-
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defendant's financial ability to retain private counsel. The 
defendant was never informed about the possibility of free 
representation and no waiver of the right to counsel was ever 
made (Addendum A). ^  
The defendant pleaded guilty to having no driver's 
license on his person, and the jury found him guilty of failure 
to obey a police officer; failure to respond to an officer's 
signal to stop; speeding; and interferance with a public servant. 
The jury found the defendant not guilty of improper display of 
license plates, and of assault on a police officer (R.164-165). 
The defendant was fined $998.00 and sentenced to thirty days 
in jail (R.336-337). . 
On appeal from the conviction to the Third Judicial 
District Court, the defendant raised the right to counsel issue. 
In his appeal brief to the Third District Court, Mr. Hamilton 
questioned the lower court's grasp of the representation issue, 
claiming, "The defendant was openly denied counsel of any kind," 
(Addendum B). 
In his memorandum decision, Judge Wilkinson affirmed 
the Circuit Court's ruling as to the defendant's right to non-
attorney counsel (R.243). All other issues were ruled in 
Repeated attempts were made by the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender's Office to obtain a tape or the transcript of the trial. 
As of the date of the filing of this appeal neither the Sandy 
Circuit Court, the Third District Court, nor the Utah Supreme 
Court can locate the tapes/transcripts. 
-3-
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/or of the lower court (R.241-247) (Addendum C). In addition, 
tfever, the District Court failed to inquire about the 
fendant's financial ability to hire an attorney on the appeal. 
e defendant was never alerted to the possibility of free 
presentation and no record can be found of a waiver of the 
ght to counsel (Addendum D) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The appellant, Myron A. Hamilton, first contends that 
.e Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal of 
Le district court decision since the issue on appeal is of a 
mstitutional nature. Such appeals are specifically allowed 
ider Utah Code Ann. §78-3-5 (1953 as amended). 
Next the appellant argues that the circuit court which 
cied the case erred by not inquiring into the defendants 
Lnancial ability to hire counsel and/or in the alternative, 
y not securing a waiver of the right to the assistance of 
ounsel. Since the defendant subsequently received a conviction 
nd a jail sentence without assistance of counsel, those convic-
ions should be reversed. The district court which heard the 
irst appeal erred by failing to fully address the right to 
lounsel issue. While the district court affirmed the lower 
:ourt's ruling as to counsel of choice, it failed to discuss 
;he broader issue of assistance of counsel at trial or the waiver 
Df that right. 
Finally, the appellant contends that his right to assist-
ance of counsel was further violated during the appeal process 
-4-
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when he was neither afforded assistance of counsel nor asked 
to wavie that right. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS JURISDIC-
TION TO CONSIDER THIS APPEAL. 
In Utah, the right of an appellant, whose case originat-
ed in a circuit court, to appeal the decision of a district 
court is governed by Utah Code Ann. §78-3-5 (1953 as amended). 
That statute states, in pertinent part: 
Appeals shall also lie to the district 
courts from the final judgment of the 
circuit courts, and from the final judg-
ments of the juvenile courts, except 
where a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court is expressly provided for. The 
decisions of the district court on 
appeals from circuit courts shall be 
final except in cases involving a con-
stitutional issue. 
This provision was upheld by this Court in State v. 
Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). The Court stated, "[The 
statute] clearly sets forth the Legislature's intent that this 
Court hear appeals from district courts in all cases involving 
a constitutional issue." _Id. at 444. See, also, State v. 
Hamilton, 22 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah 1985). The only requirement 
is that the appellant must raise a "constitutional issue." 
In this case, which originated in the Fifth Circuit 
Court, the appellate raises the issues of right to trial and 
appellate counsel. The right to counsel is guaranteed by the 
sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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.1 as article I section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. The 
reliant has therefore met the preliminary burden of raising 
constitutional issue and this appeal may be heard by this 
art. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
APPOINT AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT THE 
APPELLANT AND IN NOT OBTAINING A 
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
The record in this case reveals that during a preliminary 
oceeding, Mr. Hamilton attempted to receive legal assistance 
om an unnamed individual who was not a licensed attorney 
L. 465-67). The trial judge subsequently refused to hear the 
Ldividual since he was not a member of the Utah State Bar 
1.466)o As a result of that ruling the defendant served as 
Ls own counsel during all stages of the criminal prosecution, 
icluding his appeal to the Third District Court. While the 
trial judge did recommend that the defendant secure counsel, 
here was no inquiry as to the defendant's ability to pay for 
ounsel nor was there any suggestion that free assistance could 
e provided on request (R.466-469). 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the 
ssistance of an attorney at all critical stages in a criminal 
>rosecution. State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979); Coleman v. 
ilabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). In Powell v. 
Uabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932), the United States Supreme Court 
-6-
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said that an accused "requires the guiding hand of counsel at 
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though 
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he 
does not know how to establish his innocence." This guiding 
hand of counsel is needed at critical stages of the prosecution 
"lest the unwary concede that which only bewilderment or ignor-
ance could justify or pay a penalty which is greater than the 
law of the State exacts for the offense which they in fact and 
in law committed." Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 489 
(1945) . 
The right to assistance of counsel is guaranted by the 
sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States as 
well as article I, section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. To 
insure that an accused is assisted in preparing a defense, Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-8 (1953 as amended) states: 
A defendant charged with a public 
offense, other than an infraction, 
who is indigent and unable to obtain 
counsel has the right to court-appointed 
counsel if he faces a substantial prob-
ability of deprivation of liberty, or 
the right to represent himself. 
When a person is charged with an offense which may be punished 
by imprisonment, the accused is clearly entitled to the assistance 
of counsel. Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978). Further-
more the standard of practice which is expected of appointed counsel 
is not small. As this Court stated in State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 
918 (Utah 1979) : 
Right to counsel is not satisfied by 
a sham or pretense of an attorney but 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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an accused is entitled to assistance 
of a competent member of the bar who 
shows a willingness to identify him- i , 
self with interest of the accused and 
present such defenses as are available. 
Id. at 920, fn. 5. 
In this case, the appellant, Myron Hamilton, was not 
only charged with jailable offenses, he was sentenced to a term 
of incarceration (R.164-65). However, Mr. Hamilton was unrepre-
sented by an attorney at any stage of the proceedings against him 
(Addendum A). 
The question of whether an accused is indigent and thus 
unable to employ his own counsel is a question of fact and is to 
be determined by the trial court. Webster v. Jones, supra. 
Additionally, if an accused wishes to represent himself, thus 
waiving his right to assistance of counsel, such a waiver must 
be made knowingly and intelligently. 
The requirement that a trial court explore the accused's 
waiver was delineated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1958). 
In that case, the United States Supreme Court noted: 
It has been pointed out that "courts 
indulge every reasonable presumption 
> against waiver" of fundamental consti-
tutional rights and that we "do not 
a presume acquiescence in the loss of 
fundamental rights." . . . The con-
stitutional right of an accused to be 
represented by counsel invokes, of 
itself, the protection of a trial 
court, in which the accused—whose 
* life or liberty is at stake--is with-
out counsel. This protecting duty 
imposes the serious and weighty respon-
sibility upon the trial judge of deter-
mining whether there is an intelligent 
and competent waiver by the accused. 
-8-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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While an accused may waive the right 
to counsel, whether there is a proper 
waiver should be clearly determined by 
the trial court/ and it would be fitting 
and appropriate for that determination 
to appear upon the record. Id, at 464, 
465 (emphasis added). 
The failure of the trial court to inform an accused 
offender of his right of counsel, or in the alternative, to 
secure a knowing waiver of that right is reversable error. 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); State v. Ruple, 631 
P.2d 874 (Utah 1981); State v. Dominquez, 564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977); 
Kuehmert v. Turner, 499 P.2d 839 (Utah 1972). In addition, in a 
slightly different context (presence of counsel during police 
interrogation), the state bears a heavy burden of showing that 
a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right 
to assistance of counsel and every reasonable presumption must 
weigh against waiver. Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218 (Alaska 
1981) . The same burden should apply to the state in cases involv-
ing waiver of right to counsel at trial. 
Finally, waiver of right to counsel cannot be presumed 
from an empty record. In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 at 
516 (1962) the Supreme Court stated: "Presuming waiver from a 
silent record is unpermissible. The record must show, or there 
must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused 
was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected 
the offer. Anything less is not waiver." While this issue has 
apparently not been raised in Utah in the context of right to 
counsel, this Court had stated on at least two other occasions 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that when important constitutional rights are at stake, waiver 
will not be presumed from a silent record. Chess v. Smith, 617 
P. 2d 341 at 345 (Utah 1980) (right not to appear in prison clothes) 
and State v. Cook, 26 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 at 22 (Utah 1986) (right 
to a jury trial in criminal cases). 
In the present case the circuit court trial judge made 
no attempt to discover the financial ability of Mr. Hamilton 
to retain private counsel. There was no discussion in which the 
court advised Mr. Hamilton he could obtain appointed counsel 
(Addendum A). Further, not once did the trial court warn of the 
consequences of self-representation. Mr. Hamilton was allowed 
by the trial judge to stand alone, unaided by the assistance 
of counsel and unaware of the dire consequences of representing 
himself. Finally, the State can demonstrate no place in the 
record in which the appellant waived his right to counsel. As 
a result, he was denied his constitutional right to counsel. 
The appellant, representing himself on the first appeal 
raised this issue in the district court. Mr. Hamilton's brief 
stated in part: 
The Defendant was openly denied counsel 
of any kind. Defendant was present 
and his counsel was present and ready 
to aid the Defendant but was forbidden 
to act or counsel the Defendant. 
•v- The Trial Judge sentenced the Defendant 
to 56 days in jail. This was done in 
violation of Argersinger vs. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25 (1972): "Under the rule we 
announce today, every judge will know 
when the trial of a misdemeanor starts 
that no imprisonment may be imposed, 
-10-
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even though local law permits it, 
unless the accused is represented 
by counsel." 
(R.355, Addendum B.) While the brief went on to address an 
issue of counsel of choice, the District Court did not address 
denial of right to counsel in its decision (Addendum C). The 
appellant now contends that this issue should have been addressed 
by the district court. Because the appellant was not represented 
by counsel during the proceedings in the circuit court and because 
he did not waive his right to counsel, his convictions should be 
reversed. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO APPOINT COUNSEL FOR MR. HAMILTON 
ON THE FIRST APPEAL. 
Neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clauses 
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution 
require a state to provide counsel to an indigent defendant on 
a discretionary appeal. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
However, if an appeal is not discretionary but rather an appeal 
of right, an indigent appellant's rights, including the right 
to counsel, cannot be arbitrarily cut off. Id.. To do otherwise 
has been held to violate both due process and equal protection. 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
The right of appeal is a constitutional right in the 
State of Utah. Article I section 12 of the Constitution of Utah 
gives the accused the right to appeal in all cases (Addendum E). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1 (1953 as amended) guarantees the consti-
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tutional right of appeal for indigent defendants. That provision 
states, in pertinent part: 
The following are minimum standards 
to be provided by each county, city 
and town for the defense of indigent 
persons in criminal cases in the 
courts, o . of the state: . . . 
(5) Include the taking of a first 
appeal of right. . . . 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. §78-3-5 (1953 as amended) states that the 
first appeal from the circuit court is to the district court 
(Addendum F). No restrictions are placed on the appeal; the 
appeal is an appeal of right, not a discretionary appeal. There-
fore, as stated in Ross v. Moffitt, all rights are applicable 
including the right to counsel. Further, the right to assistance 
of counsel applies regardless of the merits of the case. Douglas 
v. California, supra. Finally, the appellate level right to 
counsel also includes the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). 
The reasons for the necessity of counsel on appeal were 
clearly outlined in Evitts v. Lucey: 
Just as a transcript may by rule or 
custom be a prerequisite to appellate 
review, the services of a lawyer will 
for virtually every layman be necessary 
to present an appeal in a form suitable 
for appellate consideration on the 
merits. . . . Therefore, Douglas v. 
California, supra, recognized that 
- the principles of Griffin required 
a State that afforded a right of 
appeal to make that appeal more than 
a "meaningless ritual" by supplying 
an indigent appellant in a criminal 
case with an attorney. . . . [T]he 
attorney must be available to assist 
-12-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in preparing and submitting a brief 
to the appellate court. [Citations 
omitted.] 
83 L.Ed.2d at 838. Further, the Court stated: "A first appeal 
as of right therefore is not adjudicated in accord with due 
process of law if the appellant does not have the effective 
assistance of an attorney." Id., at 830. 
Presumably, the right to assistance of appellate counsel 
could be waived. However, such a waiver would have to meet the 
same standards required for waiver of the right to assistance 
of trial counsel. (See Point II, supra.). The waiver would 
have to be knowingly and intelligently made and be a part of 
the record. Nothing less would meet constitutional standards. 
In the present case, Mr. Hamilton appealed his circuit 
court convictions to the district court (R.352-358). However, 
the entire appeal process apparently transpired solely on paper. 
The record reveals no personal appearance by either party before 
the district court. Furthermore, the record reveals no instance 
in which Mr. Hamilton was questioned concerning his ability to 
afford an attorney for the appeal process. The record is similar 
silent regarding a waiver of right to assistance of appellate 
counsel and the possible consequences of self-representation. 
Mr. Hamilton was never informed of the availability of appointed 
counsel and proceeded through the appellate process without 
assistance of counsel (Addendum D). 
In bringing an appeal of right from his conviction, 
Mr. Hamilton was attempting to demonstrate that his conviction 
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and the consequent loss of liberty was unlawful. To prosecute 
the appeal, the appellant faced an adversary proceeding that— 
like a trial—was governed by intricate rules that to a lay-
person would be hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented 
appellant, like an unrepresented defendant, is unable to protect 
the vital interests at stake.2 The district court, by not 
investigating the issue of assistance of counsel and by not 
securing a waiver of that right deprived Mr. Hamilton a fair 
review of his convictions in the lower court. 
CONCLUSION j 
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant, Myron 
Hamilton, seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of his 
case to the circuit court with an order for a new trial with 
the assistance of counsel. In the alternative, the appellant 
seeks reversal of the district court decision on his appeal of 
right and remand of his case to the district court with an 
order permitting a new appeal at the district court level with 
the assistance of counsel. 
2 
A perfect illustration of how inadequate a layperson 
is in protecting his rights is shown by this case. While Judge 
Wilkinson notes that the issues presented on appeal are "not 
very clear from Defendant's pleadings" (R.231) he fails to 
discuss the right to counsel issue beyond a limited ruling as 
to counsel of choice (R.233). Had an attorney been appointed 
the confusion would have never occurred and Mr. Hamilton's 
rights would have been protected. 
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Respectfully submitted this 2> ~— day of February, 
1986 
CURTIS C. NESSET ^  
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, hereby certify that four copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
-2. 5£ 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this -2 day of February, 1986. 
^OLAJU^ C - TLg^jgV-
CURTIS C. NESSET I 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DELIVERED by this day of 
February, 1986. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
MYRON A. HAMILTON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20646 
I, MYRON A. HAMILTON, being first duly sworn according 
to law on my oath depose and say: 
1. I am the appellant in the above-entitled case. 
2. At no time during the pendancy of the proceedings 
in the Fifth Circuit Court was any inquiry made concerning my 
financial ability to retain private counsel. 
3. At no time during the proceedings in Fifth Circuit 
Court was an attorney appointed to represent me. 
4. At no time during the proceedings in the Fifth 
Circuit Court did I waive my right to an attorney. 
DATED this p£f <~&ay of January, 1986. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
January, 1986. 
c 3 7 ^ day 
^•^^c^eCJ7 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires 
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Myron A. Hamilton 
9429 South 1300 West 
Township 3 S R 1 W 
Salt Lake County, Utah 84065 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
Plaintiff ] 
vs. ] 
MYRON A. HAMILTON 
Accused/Appellant 
' Case No. 83 TFSY 493 
i Appeal No. 
i APPEAL BRIEF 
COMES NOW the Defendant to move the District Court to reverse 
the conviction of the Defendant in the instant case for the follow-
ing causes. 
I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant was found guilty of failure to obey a police officer, 
interference with a public servant, failure to respond to officer's 
signal, speeding, and no driver's license on person. The Defendant 
was acquitted of improper display of license plates and assault on a 
police officer. 
The Prosecution insisted upon moving forward in a jury trial 
over the objection of the Defendant. The Defendant refused to plead, 
challenged the jurisdiction and demanded all of his Rights. 
C* " — *"" 
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The Defendant was summarily arraigned befor Judge David Brown. 
The Defendant entered no plea whatsoever and did not understand any 
of the alleged charges that had been brought by Officer Shane Smith. 
Defendant was arrested November 5, 1984 and booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail as a John Doe. The arresting officer new full well the 
name of the Defendant. There were some 9 charges brought against 
the Defendant, some of which, apparently, the prosecuting attorney 
and the officers in question dismissed.. Officer Shane Smith apparent-
ly gave the Defendant a life sentence in jail for he failed to take 
the Defendant to any magistrate to be arraigned. The Defendant had 
to secure a Writ of Habeas Corpus to be released from the Salt Lake 
County Jail on November 7th. 
The case was transferred from Judge David Brown's jurisdiction 
to a Circuit Judge by the name of Bailey Sainsbury to be heard in 
Sandy. A notice of arraignment was scheduled for January 11, 1984, 
befor Judge Sainsbury. A Motion for Dismissal was forwarded to 
Judge Sainsbury challenging any and all jurisdiction over this matter. 
The Court denied the dismissal and proceeded further with the arraign-
ment. A Motion for Discovery under Rule 16(B) was entered upon the 
court and the prosecuting attorney on December 19, 19 83. The proceed-
ings at the arraignment hearing and Motion for Dismissal Due to Incom-
plete Discovery was entered. It was denied by the Judge along with 
the dismissal. A Motion for Counsel of Choice was entered upon the 
court on the 11th of January and a brief in support thereof. A Notice 
and Demand for Veniremen to Number 12 was also introduced along with 
a Notice and Demand for Rights Sua Sponte. All were denied by the 
court. 
- 9 _ 
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The Defendant had to notice up a motion hearing for the 6th of 
February at which time the prosecuting attorney, Barbara Byrne, was 
present to answer why Defendant had not been awarded proper discovery. 
The Defendant fully intended to have depositions taken from arresting 
officers and the court of its own volition denied the accused the 
right to have depositions taken. The court of its own volition denied 
the Defendant any further information than what had been granted by 
the prosecuting attorney, at which time a Motion for the Plaintiff 
to Show Constraining Need, a Motion and Demand For Time, Motion for 
a Public Prosecutor and a Motion for Severance of Offenses were all 
denied by the court. All of the alleged offenses that had been charged 
against the Defendant other than the speeding were brought against 
the Defendant after a release from the officer and then without any 
probable cause stated, the officer entered upon private property and 
using a lethal, deadly weapon, took the Defendant under arrest stating 
no charges whatsoever. 
All of the alleged charges brought against the Defendant at this 
scene stemmed from the illegal arrest, search and seizure of the 
Defendant without probable cause. Yet the Judge denied the Motion 
for Severance of Offensed. 
The Defendant entered 5 new motions on February 9, one for 
Subpoena, a second Demand for Time and two others for depositions to 
be taken and one for the prosecuting attorney to bring forth the radar 
equipment used in the arrest, all of which were denied by the court. 
II 
The court has at every meaningful hearing along with the officers, 
jailers and/or magistrate Brown denied the Defendant to have assistance 
- 3 -
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of counsel for his defense. The Defendant was only granted 6 sub-
poenas when there were at least 5 of his own family that had to be 
subpoenaed; therefore, the Defendant was fettered in his defense. 
Under Rule 14 the Defendant is entitled to an unlimited supply of 
subpoenas for his defense. The prosecuting attorney entered the 
radar as admissible evidence after it had been denied as evidence 
to the defense. The prosecuting attorney was allowed to use it as 
evidence. 
The arresting officers did secure evidence from the Driver's 
License Department that the Defendant had a valid Utah drivers license. 
The court denied the Defendant to a grand jury indictment and a 
public prosecutor to prosecute this action. The court denied the 
Defendant a common law jury as guaranteed to him by the Seventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the iMagna Carta, 
(Article II Paragraph 2.) 
The Trial Judge did not seem to understand the difference between 
a "lawyer to represent," and a "counsel to act and advise." 
The Defendant was openly denied counsel of any kind. Defendant 
was present and his counsel was present and ready to aid the Defendant 
but was forbidden to act or counsel the Defendant. 
The Trial Judge sentenced the Defendant to 56 days in jail. This 
was done in violation of Argersinger vs. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25: "Under 
the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of 
a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though 
local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel." 
Defendant moves for dismissal pursuant to the Trial Court's 
error in denying the Defendant Unfettered counsel of choice. 
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Ill 
THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ISSUE 
The Salt Lake County Prosecutor prosecuted the case in the 
name of the State of Utah. 
The County Attorneys have no power to prosecute a criminal 
action it must be done by a public prosecutor in the name of the 
people of the State of Utah. What have we done with the people? 
How far can the Government supress them before they rebel. 
Governments have powers not rights. The County is a Corpora-
tion under the State and does not have the power to prosecute a 
criminal case any more than Boise Cascade Corporation or Kennecott 
Copper Corporation, or Albertson's Inc. does in a Criminal Case. 
Powers not granted are prohibited,(Article X U.S. Const.) 
Please refer to the rocord and see "MOTION FOR PUBLIC PROSECUTION 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO DISMISS" and the Brief in support thereof. 
IV 
DEMURRER DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL 
The Traffic Courts routinely dismiss all constitutional issues. 
This citizen is claiming right. "Where rights are involved there 
can be no rule making or legislation which could abrogate them 
"Miranda vs. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 at 491. 
Please refer to my "Writ of Error, Notice and Demand for Counsel, 
Notice and Demand for Veneremen to Number 12, Motion for Subpoena 
Duces Tecum, Motion for Subpoena, Jurisdiction, and Duties. 
V 
THE MAJOR FEDERAL QUESTION 
The final question and perhaps the most significant question 
is whether or not this person can be arrested on his own private 
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property without a warrant having never been given any reason for 
the arrest. The officers beat and kicked the Accused to a state of 
unconsciousness, dragging him some 500 yards, paralizing his arms, 
beating him about the head and face. The officer using deadly force 
in the unlawful arrest and unlawful detention. The officers never 
took the Defendant to a Magistrate according to Utah Code 77-7-23. 
Instead they gave the Defendant a life sentence in the county jail 
without a hearing of any kind before a^ny Magistrate, when one lived 
just next door to the Accused. 
A Civil action has been initiated in the U.S. District Court 
to settle the discrepancy between the arresting officers, the jailers, 
the prosecutor and the Judge that tried this action. The Judge Bailey 
Sainsbury, after being served with a copy of the complaint and a 
summons, still proceeded to prosecute this action, being a Defendant 
in a civil case in the U.S. District Court, case number 84-148W. 
May I suggest that in the interest of judicial expediency and 
exonomy that this case and all charges pertaining to it, be over-
turned by the District Court. 
Dated this / V day of / 7 ^ ^ / ^ 1984. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
1/? 
*j£ 
r<i«,. 
day of 
1984. 
My Commission Expires: 
^M/r7 
sYUiti^ / \ C^&^r 
Notary Public residing in 
drf/fs^-At* /%z**j£s . 2^^^ 
—^
 u
* 5^—y u 
/ 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I hand-delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document to Barbara Byrne, 
Salt Lake County Attorney on this day of 
rt^' 
/I(a' c ,1984 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : CASE NO. CRA-84-12 
vs. : 
MYRON A. HAMILTON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
This matter comes before the Court on appeal from a jury 
trial presided over by the Honorable C. Bailey Sainsbury in 
the Fifth Circuit Court, Sandy Department, on the 27th and 28th 
days of February, 1984. During the trial the defendant pled 
guilty to having no drivers license on his person, and the jury 
found him guilty of failure to obey a police officer; failure 
to respond to an officer's signal to stop; speeding; and interference 
with a public servant. The jury found him not guilty of improper 
display of license plates, and of assault on a police officer. 
The defendant appeals from these convictions on various grounds, 
some of which are not very clear from defendant's pleadings. 
The basic facts are that on the 5th day of November, 1983 
at approximately 6:34 p.m. in the area of 350 West 10600 South, 
Officer Smith observed a white Chevrolet pickup with no visible 
license, plates, which was increasing its speed at a rapid rate. 
^^rfLJLf 
%i
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STATE V. HAMILTON PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
He checked the speed on radar, and the unit indicated the pickup 
was traveling 51 mph in a residential area. The Officer turned 
on his overhead lights at approximately 900 West and 10600 South, 
but the vehicle failed to respond. The Officer then turned 
on his spotlight to get the driver's attention, but the vehicle 
did not stop. It finally stopped at 1300 West and 10550 South. 
As the Officer approached the vehicle, a verbal altercation 
occurred, and the Officer asked the driver to produce his license. 
The driver refused, and the Officer informed him that he was 
under arrest, and requested that he step out of the vehicle. 
The driver refused, and sped north in his vehicle. The Officer 
pursued, with his lights and siren activated. The pickup turned 
into a dirt lane at approximately 9450 South 1300 West, and 
drove through an open gate. The young man jumped from the truck, 
closed the gate, and locked it. The Officer entered the property 
with a shotgun, and demanded that the driver exit from the vehicle 
and place his hands on the truck. Officer Smith then asked 
Officer Foster to handcuff the driver. The driver pulled away, 
and indicated that she wasn't man enough to handcuff him. Officer 
Smith then proceeded to handcuff the defendant, and a struggle 
ensued, and Officers Gary Cox and Gene Wallace arrived, and 
assisted in subduing the defendant. They then proceeded to 
transport the defendant to the police vehicle, but a struggle 
ensued at the closed gate, and the defendant and the Officer 
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fell to the ground. A verbal altercation ensued, at which time 
the defendant yelled, "police brutality." The defendant was 
then carried to the police vehicle and strapped in, and taken 
to the Salt Lake county Jail, where he demanded to be taken 
before a magistrate immediately. For further facts and details 
on the legal proceedings please refer to the briefs filed by 
the plaintiff and defendant. The Court having reviewed the 
pleadings, the transcript and the briefs filed by the parties, 
finds and rules as follows: 
1. The defendant requested the Court appoint him counsel 
of his choice, being a person who had not been admitted to practice 
law before the Courts of the state of Utah. This Court finds 
that Judge Sainsbury did not commit error in refusing to appoint 
such counsel for an individual who is not permitted to practice 
law in the state of Utah without a license. It is also not 
a denial of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights where the 
court refuses to permit a non-lawyer to act as his counsel. 
See, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-51-25 (1953 as amended); U.S. v. 
Kelly, 539 F.2d 1199; U.S. v. Jordan, 508 F.2d 750. 
2. The defendant contends that the County Attorney's Office 
is not the proper office to prosecute a case of this type, and 
they cannot prosecute the case on behalf of the people of the 
State of Utah. The Constitution of the State of Utah, and the 
Utah statutes explicitly provide the County Attorney is a public 
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prosecutor, and they are required to prosecute and conduct on 
behalf of the State of Utah all prosecutions for public offenses 
committed within the County. See, the Utah Constitution, Art, 8, 
Section 10; Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-18-1 (1953 as amended). 
3. The defendant suggests that he could only be arrested 
upon the issuance of an arrest warrant, and therefore the arrest 
by the officers was illegal. The Utah law provides that a peace 
officer may make a warrantless arrest where a public offense 
is committed in his presence, and a public offense is defined 
as including a misdemeanor. See, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-2, 
and Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23. An officer is 
not required to inform the defendant, or give him notice of 
intention to cause an arrest, or his authority for the arrest 
when the person being arrested is actively engaged in the commission 
of the offense, or is pursued immediately after the commission 
of such an offense. See, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-6 (1953 
as amended. An officer may follow a defendant onto his private 
property and effect the arrest when the offense was committed 
in their presence, and they are in fresh pursuit of the suspect. 
See, Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23. There is ho merit to 
defendant's contention that he was held for an unnecessary length 
of time before being taken before a magistrate for arraignment. 
It is not unusual to be arrested on a Saturday, which the defendant 
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was, and be held until the following Monday when the court is 
in session. 
4. The defendant alleges that he was prejudiced by the 
Court only allowing the issuance of six subpoenas, but yet he 
fails to state who he would have subpoenaed, and what further 
evidence he might have brought in, and how he was prejudiced. 
The court in its wisdom felt that the defendant may try to make 
a mockery of the judicial system, and therefore exercised his 
discretion, and limited the number of subpoenas that would be 
issued. See, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-35-33. 
5. The defendant also charges that his constitutional 
rights were violated when he was not allowed to have a twelve-man 
jury. The Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-46-5 (1953 as amended) 
provides that in non-capital cases juries may number less than 
twelve. This has been upheld in the case of Salt Lake City 
v. West Gallery, Inc., 573 P. 2d 1283. The U.S. Supreme Court 
in the case of Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, held that it 
was not a violation of an individual's constitutional right 
to trial by jury. The defendant also contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. He makes some broad allegations that he was denied a 
subpoena duces tecum in not being allowed to inspect the radar 
gun, that he was denied a due process of law, tfiat there was 
prejudice and bias, and that he received cruel and unusual punish-
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STATE V. HAMILTON PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ment, but he fails to show how the evidence was insufficient, 
or how he was denied any of his rights, or how he was prejudiced 
by the denial of these rights. When the defendant filed for 
an appeal, he had the burden of showing that the evidence was 
insufficient, and that reasonable minds would have reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crimes that he was charged 
with and found guilty of. See, State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443. 
This Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, and can only upset that verdict if the Court 
is convinced that reasonable minds, based upon the evidence, 
could not find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See, State v. Garcia, 683 P.2d 60. The Court finds, based upon 
the foregoing, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury 
to find the defendant guilty on all counts, and remands the 
matter back to the Circuit Court for the imposition of sentence. 
Dated this //yvn^day of December, 1984. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following this I/JVKS day of December, 1984. 
Barbara J, Byrne* 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
3839 South West Temple, Suite 1A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Myron A. Hamilton 
Defendant/Appellant 
9429 South 1300 West 
Township 3 S R 1 W 
Riverton, Utah 84065 
S^-^^fUvM^ 
<?ZlA 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
MYRON A, HAMILTON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20646 
I, MYRON A. HAMILTON, being first duly sworn according 
to law on my oath depose and say: 
1. I am the appellant in the above-entitled case. 
2. At no time during the pendency of the appeal in Third 
District Court was any inquiry made concerning my financial 
ability to retain private counsel. 
3. At no time during the appeal in Third District Court 
was an attorney appointed to represent me. 
4. At no time during the appeal in the Third District 
Court did I waive my right to an attorney. 
DATED this day of January, 1986. 
-{SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
January, _1986. 
<SE:*** 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
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ART. I, 5 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have tlie right 1o appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, lo demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy Ihereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel, the aMondar.ee of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, bo compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wi'e shall not, be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against, his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
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78-3-5. Appeals from inferior courts. Appeals shall lie from the final judg-
ments of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the district courts, 
on both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions as are 
or may be provided by law; and the decisions of the district courts on these appeals 
shall be final, except in cases involving a constitutional issue . Appeals shall also 
lie to the district courts from the final judgments of the circuit courts, and from 
the final judgments of the juvenile courts, except where a direct appeal- 4,0 the 
Supreme Court is expressly provided f'ir. The decisions of the district court on 
appeals from circuit courts shall be final except in cases involving a constitutional 
issue. 
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